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1. Introduction
The neoclassical model of a competitive consumer plays a central role in economic analysis,
yet it often conflicts with consumption data. Observed consumer behavior is often inconsistent
in the sense that it violates the revealed preference axioms and therefore cannot be derived
from utility maximization (Battalio, et. al. (1973), Koo and Hasenkamp (1972), Sippel (1997),
Mattei (2000)). Such inconsistency can appear for many reasons (Sen (1997)). A consumer’s
preferences might depend on the budget situation, e.g., when prices provide information about
quality. Preferences might change over time and the consumer might be subject to constraints
that are not modeled. The analyst might not observe all the demands or might observe some
of them with errors. (But none of these reasons can account for the inconsistencies found in
consumption experiments by Sippel (1997) and Mattei (2000).) Alternatively, the consumer
might have incomplete or random preferences or might make mistakes.
Whatever the reasons for the inconsistencies, they call into question inferences about eco-
nomic welfare that are drawn from consumption data. The inconsistencies can also be important
for positive analysis since various authors claim that small deviations from optimization can
have large effects on the allocation of resources (e.g., Thaler (1992)). It is natural to ask to what
extent the simple neoclassical model conflicts with the data. Are consumers’ inconsistencies
small enough to be ignored? To answer this question one needs a sensible measure of demand
inconsistency.
Inconsistencies can be a problem when the neoclassical consumer model is applied to aggre-
gate demand. When a representative consumer model is used to analyze changes in policy or
technology, one implicitly assumes that aggregate demand is generated by utility maximization.
This assumption does not conflict with most aggregate time series data: aggregate demands for
many countries satisfy the strong axiom of revealed preference over long periods (e.g., Lands-
burg (1983)). However the aggregate time series might be consistent only because the historical
path of prices and aggregate income is very special. When real income is continually rising with
little relative price variation, it can be impossible to detect violations of the revealed prefer-
ence axioms. It does not follow that aggregate demands would continue to be consistent after
hypothetical policy or technology changes of interest.
The standard way to study demand responses to hypothetical policy or technology changes
is to work with estimated parametric demand functions. Often these estimated demand functions
are not derivable from utility maximization (e.g., Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)). But this should
come as no surprise. Even if the individual consumers are utility maximizers, aggregate demand
generically violates the strong axiom of revealed preference, and therefore behaves differently from
the demand of a single competitive consumer (Gorman (1953), Jerison (1994)). How differently
presumably depends on the sizes of the violations of the strong axiom. But how are these
violations to be measured?
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The measurement problem is illustrated in Figure 1. Suppose that a consumer demands the
vector xj when the price vector is pj (j = 1, 2). When xj is chosen, xk (k 6= j) could have been
bought with money left over. Therefore each xj is revealed preferred to xk (k 6= j), and the
choices violate the weak axiom. The question is by how much.
The best-known measures of the violations are due to Afriat (1973) and Varian (1985).
Afriat’s “cost-inefficiency” measure is based on the idea that an inconsistent consumer is wasting
money since there is a consumption bundle both cheaper and revealed preferred to the bundle
that is chosen. In Figure 1, when the price vector is p2, the consumer could save the fraction
|a− x1|/|a| of the available budget by switching from x2 to x1, which is revealed preferred. (| · |
denotes the Euclidean norm.) Similarly, when the price vector is p1, the consumer could save
the fraction |b−x2|/|b| of the budget by switching from x1 to x2. The smaller of these fractional
savings is Afriat’s (1973) “cost-inefficiency” measure. If income is fixed at 1, the cost-inefficiency
is the smallest income wastage that is consistent with the given demand data. (For more detailed
discussion, see section 2, below.)
Varian (1985) proposes an alternative measure: the minimum distance from the given data
to data that satisfy the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP), a slightly weakened
version of the strong axiom. In Figure 1, that measure is the distance between x1 and z. The
inconsistency is larger according to either measure if the demand at price vector p1 is x instead
of x1. Both measures can be defined for any number of observations.
Afriat’s cost-inefficiency is the most commonly used measure of violations of the revealed
preference axioms, and Varian (1990) recommends it as being an economic, as opposed to sta-
tistical, measure. However Gross (1991) and Jerison and Jerison (1993) point out that it has a
drawback. It is very sensitive to the amount of price variation in the data. If in Figure 1, there
were little price variation then the budget lines would be nearly parallel and the cost-inefficiency
would be small no matter what choices the consumer made. But the amount of price variation
is a property of the environment, not of the consumer’s behavior, so the cost-inefficiency is not
just a measure of behavioral inconsistency. There is no easy solution to this problem. With finite
data, any reasonable measure of inconsistency will depend on the environment. Still, it is useful
to know in what way an intuitive inconsistency measure like the cost-inefficiency depends on the
amount of price variation.
The present paper shows how a slight modification of the cost-inefficiency depends locally on
the amount of price variation and on behavioral inconsistency summarized by the Slutsky matrix.
A smooth demand function is generated by utility maximization if and only if it has a symmetric,
negative semidefinite Slutsky matrix. We relate the sizes of revealed preference inconsistencies
to violations of the two Slutsky conditions. We use this result to justify a new measure of
local inconsistency based on the Slutsky matrix. The new measure is behavioral since it is
determined by the demand function and does not depend on the amount of price variation. The
inconsistency measure can be applied to aggregate demand if the aggregate demand is a smooth
function of aggregate income and prices (as happens when individual incomes are determined by
aggregate income and prices through a smooth distribution or sharing rule). The inconsistency
measure then indicates the extent to which the aggregate demand deviates from the demand of
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a single optimizing consumer. We characterize the new inconsistency measure by exploiting the
close connection between the cost-inefficiency and real income growth along revealed preference
cycles, which we describe next.
We will show that as one moves along a revealed preference cycle, real income grows from
each observation to the next, yet one returns to where one started. The subtlety is that this
proposition requires real income to be defined using a Laspeyres price index with a consumption
base that is updated at each step along the cycle. (For details, see section 2.) Defined in this
way, the real income growth along a revealed preference cycle is very different from growth in a
business cycle. In a business cycle, real income rises then falls. In a revealed preference cycle
real income is always rising yet the prices and consumer demands return to their initial levels.
The real growth is illusory, like the climbers’ ascent of Escher’s staircase in “Ascending and
Descending” (Escher (1982)). Demand inconsistency is equivalent to existence of such a cycle.
When income is fixed at 1, Afriat’s cost-inefficiency is the minimum real income growth rate
along the worst revealed preference cycle. (For details, see section 2.)
On Escher’s staircase you cannot tell whether you are going up or down. The same can
happen to real income under proposed reforms of the U.S. consumer price index. Revealed
preference inconsistency makes real income growth incoherent when it is defined using a frequently
updated Laspeyres price index. The incoherence does not arise if the base for the price index
remains fixed. But frequent updating of the consumption base is one of the reforms recommended
by the recent CPI Commission (Boskin, et. al. 1998). The Commission also recommended
replacing the Laspeyres index by a “superlative” index (Diewert (1976)) based on both current
and past consumption. In practice, however, information on current consumption is unavailable
since collecting and processing the data takes time. So, for the foreseeable future, the U.S.
consumer price index is likely to remain a Laspeyres index, possibly with more frequent updating
of the consumption base. Our paper provides a framework for measuring the incoherence that
such frequent updating can introduce. For a given small amount of price variation we find the
highest constant real income growth rate compatible with prices and demands returning to their
initial values.
Our main theorem (Theorem 1) shows how this highest constant real income growth rate
depends on the amount of price variation and on an inconsistency index computed from the
Slutsky matrix. When each price can vary over the interval [1− r, 1 + r] the real income growth
rate along the worst revealed preference cycle is approximately r2 times the Slutsky inconsistency
index. If the Slutsky index is 1 and if prices can vary up or down by up to 10% then there is a
path along which real income grows at a rate of approximately 1% from each observation to the
next, yet nominal income and prices return to their starting values. If prices vary up or down
by only 1% then the real income growth rate along the worst cycle is reduced to approximately
0.01%.
The Slutsky index is the only inconsistency measure derived from the Slutsky matrix that
satisfies a set of reasonable axioms (Theorem 2). In particular, it does not vary when the
commodity units change or when goods with fixed relative prices are aggregated. If the Slutsky
matrix is known, the index and a nearly worst cycle can be computed using an efficient quadratic
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programming algorithm due to Coleman and Li (1996). Even if the Slutsky matrix is not known,
Theorem 1 provides information about the way that real growth along the worst cycle depends
on the variation in prices.
It is not at all obvious how violations of the Slutsky conditions should be measured or
interpreted. The problem of interpretation arises, for example, when Browning and Chiappori
(1998) use the Slutsky matrix to test for consumption efficiency in the “collective” model of
household demand. For a two-member household with efficient consumption, the Slutsky matrix
can be asymmetric, but if it is, then it must equal a symmetric matrix plus a matrix of rank one.
The amount of Slutsky asymmetry in an empirical analysis has a statistical interpretation. It
indicates the strength of rejection of a “unitary” model in which the household acts like a single
optimizer. Our main theorem provides an economic interpretation for sizes of Slutsky violations
by relating them to real income growth along cycles.
The Slutsky conditions have been linked separately to revealed preference inconsistencies
in two classic papers. Kihlstrom, et. al. (1976) show that Slutsky negative semidefiniteness
is equivalent to a weak version of the weak axiom. Hurwicz and Richter (1979) show that
Slutsky symmetry is equivalent to Ville’s (1946) axiom, a differential version of the strong axiom.
Jerison and Jerison (1992, 1993) provide quantitative theorems showing how violations of Slutsky
symmetry or negative semidefiniteness control respectively the sizes of violations of Ville’s axiom
or the weak axiom. These results are discussed below in section 6.
Testing for Ville’s axiom requires a continuum of demand data. The present paper extends
the previous literature by analyzing discrete cycles and by relating them to the two Slutsky
conditions together. The relationship allows us to solve a long-standing open problem in demand
theory. Samuelson (1938) asked if a finite upper bound could be placed on the number of
observations needed to reject the hypothesis that a demand function is generated by utility
maximization. Shafer (1977) gives a partial answer. He first shows that there cannot be an a
priori bound. For each K he exhibits a smooth demand function that violates Slutsky symmetry
and has no revealed preference cycle with fewer than K observations. It follows that any finite
bound must depend on information about the specific demand function. Shafer then derives a
bound that depends on the Slutsky matrix. The more asymmetric the matrix, the smaller the
number of observations required to form a revealed preference cycle. But Shafer’s bound applies
only to demand functions that are linear in income. In section 5, below, we obtain a bound that
applies to every C1 demand function and is tighter than Shafer’s bound in the case of demands
that are linear in income.
In the next section we present notation and preliminary results. We show that real income
grows continually as one moves along a revealed preference cycle if the consumption base of the
Laspeyres price index is updated at each step. We also show how Afriat’s cost-inefficiency is
related to the real income growth along cycles. In Section 3 we introduce a class of inconsistency
measures derived from the Slutsky matrix. Then we state the main theorem relating the real
growth along cycles to the Slutsky measures and the amount of price variation. In Section 4, we
pick one Slutsky measure, the “Slutsky index” of local demand inconsistency, and characterize
it by means of reasonable axioms. In Section 5 we derive an upper bound on the number
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of observations required to uncover revealed preference inconsistency. In Section 6 we discuss
related literature and remaining open problems. The longer proofs are in Section 7.
2. Preliminaries
We consider a C1 demand function, i.e., a function h : IR++ × Rn++ −→ IRn+ that satisfies
the budget identity ph(y, p) = y for all (y, p)  0. (Note that we do not require the demand
function to be homogeneous of degree zero.) We write dot products of vectors, omitting the dot.
The column vector h(y, p) = (h1(y, p), . . . , hn(y, p))T represents the vector of demands at income
y > 0 and price vector p 0, with jth component pj , the price of good j. (A vector x is treated
as a column vector with jth component xj . Superscript T denotes the transpose.) A vector (y, p)
of income and prices is called a budget situation. Whenever we use the term “demand function,”
we mean for the function to be C1. The Slutsky matrix of h at (y, p) is
S(y, p) ≡ hp(y, p) + hy(y, p)h(y, p)T ,
with ij component (∂hi/∂pj) + (∂hi/∂y)hj evaluated at (y, p).
The demand function h is said to be generated by a utility function u : IRn+ −→ IR if for
every (y, p) 0, h(y, p) is the unique maximizer of u(x) over the budget set {x ∈ IRn+ : px ≤ y}.
The C1 demand function h is generated by some utility function u if and only if the Slutsky
matrix of h at each (y, p)  0 is symmetric and negative semidefinite (Theorem 1 of Jerison
and Jerison, 1993). (An n × n matrix M (not necessarily symmetric) is negative semidefinite
[respectively, positive semidefinite] if xTMx ≤ [≥]0 for each n-vector x.)
We will focus on demand behavior near a fixed budget situation (y∗, p∗). Let S¯ and A denote
respectively the symmetric and antisymmetric parts of the Slutsky matrix of h at (y∗, p∗). This
means that
S¯ ≡ (1/2)[S(y∗, p∗) + S(y∗, p∗)T ] and A ≡ (1/2)[S(y∗, p∗)− S(y∗, p∗)T ]. (1)
Demand functions are typically not generated by utility maximization if there are more than
two goods. In that case asymmetry of the Slutsky matrix is a generic property. Perturbations of
any smooth demand function typically violate Slutsky symmetry.
If a demand function is not generated by a utility function then it exhibits inconsistencies
called revealed preference cycles. One budget situation (y, p) is strictly revealed preferred (for h)
to another, (z, q), if the demand vector chosen in the second situation could have been afforded in
the first with money left over, i.e., if y > ph(z, q). A sequence {ak}Kk=0 of elements of a Euclidean
space is called a cycle of length K or a K-cycle if aK = a0. A strict revealed preference cycle (for
h) is a cycle of budget situations {(yk, pk)}Kk=0 such that (yk, pk) is strictly revealed preferred to
(yk−1, pk−1) for k = 1, . . . ,K.
The demand function h satisfies the weak weak axiom of revealed preference if it has no strict
revealed preference cycles of length two. If h is generated by the utility function u and situation
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(y, p) is strictly revealed preferred to (z, q), then it is easy to see that u(h(y, p)) > u(h(z, q)). It
follows that if h is generated by utility maximization it cannot have any strict revealed preference
cycles. The converse is also true, so utility maximization is equivalent to the absence of strict
revealed preference cycles. (See Corollary 3, below.)
Strict revealed preference can be quantified through its connection with real income growth.
The connection comes from the fact that one situation is strictly revealed preferred to another
whenever a move from the latter to the former raises real income, as defined below. Therefore, as
one moves along a revealed preference cycle, real income is always growing yet one returns to the
starting point. The rate of real income growth can be used to measure the demand inconsistency.
The relation between real growth and inconsistency is relevant for the debate over price index
reform.
We now formulate these ideas more precisely. Real income growth is defined by adjusting
the actual (nominal) income change to take account of price changes. Real income growth is
connected with demand inconsistency when it is defined using a Laspeyres price index. Con-
sider a cycle of budget situations {(yk, pk)}Kk=0 and let xk ≡ h(yk, pk) be the demand vector in
situation k. The Laspeyres price index for situation k with base situation m is L(pk, pm;xm) ≡
(pkxm)/(pmxm). There is real income growth from observation k − 1 to situation k (using the
Laspeyres price index with base k − 1) if the nominal income in situation k is larger than the
income in situation k−1 multiplied by the price index for k, i.e., if yk > L(pk, pk−1;xk−1)yk−1 =
pkxk−1. We call yk − pkxk−1 the real income growth rate from situation k − 1 to k. It is the
income in situation k minus the Laspeyres “cost of living” (the cost of buying at current prices
what was bought in the previous situation). This real income growth rate is positive whenever
situation k is strictly revealed preferred to situation (k − 1). So with these definitions, as one
moves along a strict revealed preference cycle, real income is always growing, yet one returns to
the initial situation. The real growth is illusory, like the ascent of Escher’s staircase.
What is special about the definition of real income above is that the base of the Laspeyres
price index is updated at each step along the cycle. Such a price index is said to be chained. The
updating in the chained Laspeyres index makes the concept of real income growth incoherent
when the demand has revealed preference inconsistencies. In that case continual real growth
can bring one back to where one started. On the other hand, if the growth is defined using a
Laspeyres index with a fixed base situation then it is impossible for real income to grow at each
step along a cycle. To see this, let the base be fixed at observation 0. Then real income at
observation k is greater than at k − 1 if and only if yk/yk−1 > L(pk, p0;x0)/L(pk−1, p0;x0) =
(pkx0)/(pk−1x0). This inequality cannot hold for every k = 1, . . . ,K. If it did then one would
obtain the contradiction: 1 = ΠKk=1(yk/yk−1) > ΠKk=1[(pkx0)/(pk−1x0)] = 1. Thus, with a fixed
consumption base, real income growth is coherent even if the demand is inconsistent. Working
with a chained index can introduce incoherence, but the incoherence can be used to measure the
demand inconsistency.
To measure the inconsistency we consider the minimum real income growth rate along the
worst revealed preference cycle in a region. The minimum real growth rate of a cycle of budget
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situations {(yk, pk)}Kk=0 is
G({(yk, pk)}Kk=0) ≡ min{yk − pkh(yk−1, pk−1) : k = 1, . . . ,K}.
The minimum real growth rate depends on the commodity units. In our definition of the in-
consistency index in Section 4, we will choose units so that the base budget situation (y∗, p∗)
becomes a vector of ones. The worst cycle in a region is the cycle with the highest minimum real
growth rate. In the regions considered below, the range of allowed variation in nominal income
is an interval. In such a region, for any revealed preference cycle with nonconstant real income
growth rate, it is always possible to raise the minimum real growth rate by adjusting the nominal
income levels. Therefore the worst cycle in such a region has a constant real growth rate. We
sometimes refer to the minimum real growth rate of a cycle simply as the real growth rate of the
cycle. A strict revealed preference cycle is a cycle with a strictly positive minimum real growth
rate. It would be possible to define inconsistency measures based on the average or the maximum
real growth rate along cycles, but for such measures it is not clear how to prove limit theorems
like the ones presented below.
To state the theorems we need notation for the real growth rate of the worst cycle in a
region. Given a set X in Euclidean space, let CK(X) be the set of K-cycles with elements in X
and let C(X) ≡ ∪K≥1CK(X) be the set of all cycles with elements in X. Define
GK(X) ≡ sup{G(c) : c ∈ CK(X)} and (2)
G(X) ≡ sup{G(c) : c ∈ C(X)},
the suprema of the real growth rates of all K-cycles in X and of all cycles in X, respectively.
Since G is continuous and CK(X) is homeomorphic to the Cartesian product XK , the supremum
in (2) is attained at a worst K-cycle if X is compact.
We conclude this section by defining Afriat’s cost-inefficiency and showing that for a set X of
budget data with income fixed at 1, the cost-inefficiency is G(X), the minimum real growth rate
of the worst cycle in the data. Afriat (1973) treats the consumer as having preferences but not
necessarily choosing optimally. The consumer is choosing at “efficiency level”  or higher if no
vector costing less than the fraction  of the budget is ever preferred to what is actually chosen.
This means that the consumer is never wasting more than the fraction 1−  of the budget. The
problem for the analyst is that the consumer’s preferences are not known. Afriat’s solution is to
look for the highest efficiency level compatible with some preference relation.
To express this formally, call a relation R on IRn+ a weak preference if it is reflexive (xRx) and
transitive (xRy and yRz imply xRz). Let xm be the demand vector chosen when the price vector
is pm (m ∈M). A scalar  is called an efficiency level compatible with the relation R if, for all m
and k in M , conditions (a) and (b) are satisfied: (a) pmxk ≤ pmxm implies xmRxk; (b) xkRxm
implies pmxk ≥ pmxm. In that case, the consumer’s choice is always preferred (according to R)
to vectors that cost less than  times what is actually spent. The cost-efficiency is the supremum
of the efficiency levels compatible with some weak preference. The cost-inefficiency of the data
is 1 minus the cost-efficiency.
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Remark 1. The cost-inefficiency of the price and demand data {pm, xm}m∈M is the supremum
of min{(pkxk − pkxk−1)/(pkxk) : k = 1, . . . ,K}, with the supremum taken over all K and all
K-cycles {pk, xk}Kk=0 in the data. If the income and total expenditure are always equal to 1, then
the cost-inefficiency is G({(pm ·xm, xm)}m∈M ), the supremum of the minimum real growth rates
of cycles in the data.
Proof. Afriat (1973) shows that  is a compatible efficiency level for some weak preference if and
only if for every cycle {pk, xk}Kk=0 in the data, pkxk−1 ≤ pkxk, ∀k, implies pkxk−1 = pkxk,
∀k. Let w∗ be the cost-inefficiency of the data. If for some w there is a cycle {pk, xk}Kk=0 in the
data with (pkxk − pkxk−1)/(pkxk) > w for all k ≥ 1, then (1 − w)pkxk > pkxk−1 for k ≥ 1,
so 1 − w is larger than the cost-efficiency 1 − w∗ and w < w∗. This shows that no cycle has
mink{(pkxk − pkxk−1)/(pkxk)} higher than w∗. On the other hand, for each w less than w∗,
1 − w is larger than the cost-efficiency, so there is a cycle with (1 − w)pkxk ≥ pkxk−1, ∀k ≥ 1,
and hence mink{(pkxk − pkxk−1)/(pkxk)} ≥ w. Therefore w∗ is the supremum of the terms
mink{(pkxk − pkxk−1)/(pkxk)} for cycles in the data. If the income is always pkxk = 1 then w∗
is the supremum of the minimum real growth rates.
3. The Slutsky Matrix and Real Income Growth Along Cycles
In this section we consider revealed preference cycles in neighborhoods of a fixed budget
situation (y∗, p∗). In each neighborhood, the real growth rate of the worst cycle depends on both
the extent of the price variation and on the degree of inconsistency of the demand function. We
show how the real growth rate of the worst cycle decreases as the neighborhood shrinks. We also
relate the real growth rate to violations of the Slutsky conditions. The main result is stated in
Theorem 1.
We begin with the Slutsky matrix S at (y∗, p∗). Given a K-cycle {qk}Kk=0 ∈ CK(IRn), define
I(S, {qk}k) ≡ (1/K)
K∑
k=1
qTk S(qk − qk−1) (3)
= (1/K)
K∑
k=1
[(1/2)(qk − qk−1)T S¯(qk − qk−1) + qTk−1Aqk]. (4)
From (4), we see that I(S, {qk}k) is an average of quadratic forms of the Slutsky matrix S and
terms involving its antisymmetric part A defined in (1). We will define measures of Slutsky
violations by taking suprema of I(S, ·) over K-cycles or over all cycles in a nonempty “base” set
Q ⊂ IRn. Given Q, define
IK(S,Q) ≡ sup{I(S, {qk}k) : {qk}k ∈ CK(Q)}
I(S,Q) ≡ sup
K≥1
IK(S,Q).
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We will refer to I, IK and I as Slutsky measures. Their definitions were chosen to make the
limit equations in Theorem 1 correct. But the following remark justifies our interpreting I(S,Q)
as a measure of violations of the Slutsky conditions if Q is a neighborhood of the origin.
Remark 2. I(S,Q) is nonnegative, and is zero if S is symmetric and negative semidefinite.
Suppose now that Q is a compact neighborhood of the origin. Then I(S,Q) = 0 if and only if
S satisfies the Slutsky conditions. If Sˆ − S is symmetric and positive semidefinite for another
Slutsky matrix Sˆ, then I(Sˆ, Q) ≥ I(S,Q) and IK(Sˆ, Q) ≥ IK(S,Q). The latter inequality is
strict if the rank of Sˆ−S is n−1 (the highest possible) and IK(S,Q) > 0. Also, IK(S+ tA,Q) is
nondecreasing in t ≥ 0 and is strictly increasing if the antisymmetric part A affects the Slutsky
measure of S, i.e., if IK(S,Q) 6= IK(S¯, Q), where S¯ is the symmetric part of S, defined in (1).
Finally, if S¯ = 0, so that S = A, then I(S,Q) is a norm of the antisymmetric part A.
The proof is in section 7. Remark 2 says essentially that if the base set Q is a neighborhood of
the origin, I(S,Q) detects whether either Slutsky condition is violated, and increases (weakly)
when the violation worsens.
As a further illustration, we compute I(S,Q) for a case in which Q consists of just four
points.
Example. Let Q consist of vectors of the form (x, 0) where x is one of the following: (1, 1),
(1,−1), (−1,−1) or (−1, 1). Then only the prices of the first two goods are allowed to change
and I(S,Q) depends only on the 2× 2 leading principal minor matrix of S. Let this matrix be
Sˆ ≡
(
a b
c d
)
.
Every cycle in Q is a combination of K-cycles with K ≤ 4, so I(S,Q) = IK(Sˆ, Q) for some
K ≤ 4. By considering all possible 2, 3 and 4-cycles, we find that I(S,Q) is the maximum of the
terms
2a, 2d, 2(a+ b+ c+ d), 2(a+ d− b− c), a+ d+ |b− c|, 0.
The first four of these terms are values of the quadratic form of Sˆ. They are nonpositive if
the Slutsky matrix is negative semidefinite. If the maximum of these four terms is positive, it
measures the worst violation of Slutsky negative semidefiniteness in directions determined by Q.
Asymmetry of Sˆ means that b 6= c. The asymmetry can be measured by |b−c|. It affects the
Slutsky measure I(S,Q) only when I(S,Q) = a+d+ |b− c|, which occurs only if the asymmetry
|b− c| is sufficiently large. In that case, the index combines the asymmetry |b− c| with a+ d, the
trace of Sˆ. If Sˆ is negative semidefinite then its trace is nonpositive, and the Slutsky measure
I(S,Q) is positive only when the asymmetry |b− c| dominates the trace. Otherwise the Slutsky
measure is 0 even though Sˆ is asymmetric: the negative semidefiniteness removes the effect of the
asymmetry. In that case, detecting Slutsky asymmetry requires more than the four observations
in the example. By Remark 2, an asymmetric Slutsky matrix S (no matter how small the
asymmetry) has a positive Slutsky measure I(S,Q) when the base set of price variations is a
neighborhood of the origin.
The discussion above links I(S,Q) to violations of the two Slutsky conditions. Next, we link
it to local demand inconsistency as measured by real income growth along cycles.
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Theorem 1. Consider a compact set Q ⊂ IRn, a cycle {qk}k in CK(Q) and a scalar γ >
max{|qTh(y∗, p∗)| : q ∈ Q}. Let N ≡ [−γ, γ]×Q. Then
lim
r→0 r
−2 sup{G({(y∗ + rzk, p∗ + rqk)}Kk=0) : |zk| ≤ γ, ∀k} = I(S, {qk}) (5)
lim
r→0 r
−2GK((y∗, p∗) + rN) = IK(S,Q) and
lim
r→0 r
−2G((y∗, p∗) + rN) = I(S,Q).
The expression sup{G({(y∗ + rzk, p∗ + rqk)}Kk=0) : |zk| ≤ γ, ∀k} on the left side of (5) is the
highest minimum real growth rate for cycles in which the kth price vector is p∗+ rqk and the kth
income differs from y∗ by no more than rγ. According to the theorem, when the right side of
(5) is positive, this highest minimum real growth rate shrinks approximately in proportion to r2
as r approaches 0. The theorem provides the same information when the qk are allowed to vary
over an arbitrary base set Q. The constant of proportionality in each case is the corresponding
Slutsky measure.
In the proof of Theorem 1 we construct a nearly worst revealed preference K-cycle in
(y∗, p∗) + rN for small r. The price vectors in this cycle can be computed by maximizing
the right side of (3). Thus, the problem of finding a nearly worst K-cycle in a small region
is reduced to a quadratic programming problem. As we see from the definition of N , nominal
income y is restricted to an exogenously given interval: |y − y∗| ≤ rγ. This restriction is not
likely to matter since γ can be chosen to be as large as one wishes. We conjecture that the
restriction on the income variation can be removed altogether. In any case, for sufficiently small
r, the exogenous bound on the income variation is not binding. The income levels in the nearly
worst cycle constructed in the proof of Theorem 1 differ from y∗ by strictly less than rγ.
We conclude this section by applying Theorem 1 to prove part of the classic characterization
of the weak weak axiom by Kihlstrom, et. al. (1976).
Corollary 1. If a C1 demand function satisfies the weak weak axiom of revealed preference,
then at each point of its domain, its Slutsky matrix is negative semidefinite.
Proof. Suppose that the Slutsky matrix fails to be negative semidefinite. Then there exists p
with pT S¯p > 0. Let q0 = q2 = p∗ and let q1 = p∗+ p. Then (q1− qk)T S¯(q1− qk) > 0 for k = 0, 2.
By (3) and (4), I(S, {qk}2k=0) > 0, since AT = −A. By Theorem 1, there is a strict revealed
preference 2-cycle.
4. An Index of Local Inconsistency
We have not yet defined an inconsistency measure that depends on demand behavior alone.
The Slutsky measures defined above depend on commodity units and on the base set Q. In
this section we propose a local inconsistency index that removes this dependence, namely,
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I(S∗, [−1, 1]n), where the normalized Slutsky matrix S∗ is defined in (6), below. The base
set of price variations is a box. We show in Theorem 2 that this is the only choice of base set (up
to scalar multiple) that satisfies a set of reasonable axioms. The most important of the axioms
is that the measure does not change when goods with fixed relative prices are aggregated.
A simple way to deal with the dependence on commodity units is to specify the units in such
a way that income and all prices in the base situation are equal to 1. Then absolute deviations
from the base values of income and prices are also fractional deviations. Suppose we start with
arbitrary commodity units and an arbitrary base situation (y∗, p∗). We define new units in the
following way. One new unit of good j is equal to y∗/p∗j old units, and one new unit of money
is y∗ old units. Then when the old price vector is p∗, the cost of one new unit of good j is y∗ old
units of money or one new unit of money. Therefore the old income and price vector (y∗, p∗) is
replaced by a vector of 1’s in the new units. In the new units, the demand function h becomes h˜
with h˜j(y, p) ≡ (p∗j/y∗)hj(yy∗, p1p∗1, . . . , pnp∗n). The Slutsky matrix of this modified demand
function evaluated at the (n+ 1)-vector of ones is
S∗ ≡ (1/y∗)P ∗S(y∗, p∗)P ∗, (6)
where P ∗ is the diagonal matrix with p∗j as its jj component. Note that S∗ is unaffected by
changes in commodity or money units. Also, S∗ is symmetric [resp. negative semidefinite] if and
only if S(y∗, p∗) is.
Next we consider the choice of Q, the base set of price variations. While this choice is
somewhat arbitrary, the Slutsky measures are easier to describe and interpret if Q has a simple
shape. Letting Q be a ball simplifies the computation, but creates problems when one compares
demand functions with different dimensional commodity spaces. For such comparisons it is better
to let Q be a box. To justify this claim we will need some additional terminology. In what follows,
we assume that units have been chosen so that the base budget situation is a vector of 1’s. Let
1m denote the m-vector of 1’s. Let pij be the projection of a vector onto the jth coordinate:
pij(q1, . . . , qm) ≡ qj , for q = (q1, . . . , qm) ∈ IRm
and let ψj(q) be the vector obtained from q by removing its jth coordinate:
ψj(q1, . . . , qm) ≡ (q1, q2, . . . , qj−1, qj+1, . . . , qm).
To be able to compare demand functions in different dimension commodity spaces we must
specify a base set of price variations Qn ⊂ IRn for each dimension n = 1, . . . ,∞. Consider the
n-good demand function h and its worst K-cycle with price vectors in 1n+rQn. The real growth
rate along this cycle (divided by r2) is a measure of the inconsistency of h over this set of budgets.
But suppose that in h the demand for some good j is always zero. Then the inconsistency of h,
the demand function for n goods, should be the same as the inconsistency of hˆ formed from h
by dropping the jth good. The worst K-cycle for hˆ must have the same real growth rate as the
worst cycle for h. But the only way to ensure this for all demand functions is to require that in
the original cycle, when the jth price is removed from each price vector we obtain a price vector
in 1n−1 + rQn−1. This justifies imposing the following restriction on the base sets Qn:
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(A1) For each integer n ≥ 2, and each positive integer j ≤ n, if q ∈ Qn then ψj(q) ∈ Qn−1.
A second restriction on the base sets is suggested by the effects of Hicks-Leontief aggregation
of commodities. Let hˆ be a demand function for n+ 1 goods, and suppose that along the cycle
{(yk, pk)}k the price of good n equals the price of good n+1, i.e., pnk = pn+1k for each observation
k. For these observations, goods n and n+1 can be aggregated, with the price of good n treated
as the price of the new aggregated good. This yields the aggregated demand function h defined
by hj(y, p1, . . . , pn−1, pn) ≡ hˆj(y, p1, . . . , pn−1, pn, pn) for j = 1, . . . , n− 1, and
hn(y, p1, . . . , pn−1, pn) ≡ hˆn(y, p1, . . . , pn−1, pn, pn) + hˆn+1(y, p1, . . . , pn−1, pn, pn).
It is easy to verify that this h satisfies the budget identity.
The real income growth from one observation to the next is unaffected when goods with
equal prices are aggregated. To see this, note that the real income growth from observation k
to k + 1 for hˆ is yk+1 − pk+1 · hˆ(yk, pk) = yk+1 − ψn+1(pk+1) · h(yk, ψn+1(pk)). Thus aggre-
gation or disaggregation of goods with equal prices should have no effect on measured demand
inconsistency. This is assured by requiring
(A2) For integers n and j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, if q = (q1, . . . , qn) ∈ Qn then (q, pij(q)) ∈ Qn+1.
According to (A2), if we start with an n-good price vector in the base set Qn and we create an
n + 1-good price vector by repeating one of the original prices, then the new price vector is in
the base set Qn+1 in the n+ 1-good model.
It is natural to assume that the range of allowed variation for each price is unbroken:
(A3) If x,w ∈ Qn and q ∈ IRn satisfy ψj(x) = ψj(w) = ψj(q) and wj ≤ qj ≤ xj , then q ∈ Qn.
Axiom (A3) states that if the vectors x, w and q differ only in their jth components and if
qj is between wj and xj and w and x are in Qn then q is in Qn too.
Finally, we make a simplifying assumption: that each Qn is symmetric about the origin in
each coordinate.
(A4) For each integer n > 0, if x ∈ Qn, z ∈ IRn, ψj(x) = ψj(z) and xj = −zj for some j, then
z ∈ Qn.
Axioms (A1) through (A4) imply that the base sets Qn are boxes.
Theorem 2. For each positive integer n let Qn be a nonempty compact subset of IRn. If the
sets Qn satisfy axioms (A1) through (A4), then there is a scalar α > 0 such that Qn = [−α, α]n
for each n.
Proof. Combining (A3) and (A4) we see that Q1 = [−α, α] for some α > 0. By (A1), Qn ⊂
[−α, α]n for every n. We claim that Qn = [−α, α]n for each n. Suppose that the claim is
true for some n. Then the n-vector with all components equal to α is in Qn and, by (A2), the
(n+ 1)-vector with all components equal to α is in Qn+1. By (A4), the (n+ 1)-vector with first
component −α and all other components equal to α is in Qn+1. Suppose that x ∈ [−α, α]n+1.
Axiom (A3) implies that the (n + 1)-vector (x1, α, . . . , α) is in Qn+1. Repeating this argument
we find that (x1, x2, α, . . . , α) and x are in Qn+1. Therefore, [−α, α]n+1 ⊂ Qn+1, and the claim
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holds for all n by induction.
Since α in Theorem 2 is arbitrary, we can let it equal 1. We therefore propose as a measure of
inconsistency for h at (y∗, p∗) the
Slutsky index: I(S∗, [−1, 1]n),
where S∗ is the transformed Slutsky matrix defined in (6), above.
By Theorem 1, for the n-good demand function h and for small r, the real growth rate along the
worst cycle with prices in [1− r, 1 + r] is approximately r2I(S∗, [−1, 1]n). As the range of price
variation shrinks the real growth rate shrinks approximately in proportion to the square of the
price variation. The proportionality constant is the Slutsky index.
The Slutsky index can be computed using the very efficient box-constrained quadratic pro-
gramming algorithm of Coleman and Li (1996). For example, computing the index and the worst
10-cycles in an 8 good demand model (requiring search over a space of dimension 80) took less
than one second on a 500 megahertz PC.
5. How Many Observations Are Required To Form a Cycle?
In this section we will use Theorem 1 to place a finite upper bound on the number of
observations required to form a strict revealed preference cycle. The bound depends on the
Slutsky matrix. Shafer (1977) derives such a bound for demand functions that are linear in
income. His bound and its proof are both quite complicated. We obtain a simpler bound that
applies to all smooth demand functions and is tighter than Shafer’s in his case of demands that
are linear in income.
To obtain a general bound, it is enough to restrict attention to cycles with price vectors
evenly spaced around a circle. For these cycles, the Slutsky inconsistency measure is given in the
following.
Theorem 3. Fix u and v in IRn and K ≥ 3, and let qk ≡ [cos(2pik/K)]u+ [sin(2pik/K)]v for
k = 0, 1, . . . ,K. Then
I(S, {qk}k) = (1/2)[1− cos(2pi/K)](uT S¯u+ vT S¯v) + [sin(2pi/K)]uTAv. (7)
By combining Theorems 1 and 3 we obtain information about the number of observations
required to form revealed preference cycles. We present several applications in the rest of this
section
Corollary 2. If the Slutsky matrix of h is skew-symmetric and nonzero, then there exists a
strict revealed preference cycle consisting of three observations.
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Proof. If the Slutsky matrix S is skew-symmetric and nonzero, then S = A 6= 0. In that case, by
Lemma 1 in Section 7, there exist orthogonal unit vectors u and v such that uTAv > 0. With
K = 3, the right side of (7) becomes (
√
3/2)uTAv > 0. The price vectors in the corresponding
cycle are vertices of an equilateral triangle.
A possibly discontinuous demand function is generated by utility maximization if it satisfies
mild regularity conditions and has no revealed preference cycles (Richter, 1979). Theorem 3
implies that a smooth demand function is generated by utility maximization if it has no strict
revealed preference cycles.
Corollary 3. If h has no strict revealed preference cycles, then h is generated by a util-
ity function, and at each budget situation the Slutsky matrix of h is symmetric and negative
semidefinite.
Proof. If there are no 2-cycles, then S is negative semidefinite by Corollary 1. If the Slutsky
matrix is asymmetric then there are vectors u and v such that uTAv > 0. Since sin θ/(1− cos θ)
approaches infinity as θ goes to 0, the right side of (7) can be made positive by letting K be
sufficiently large. In that case, by Theorem 1, h has a strict revealed preferenceK-cycle. So under
the hypothesis, h satisfies the budget identity and the Slutsky conditions, hence is generated by
utility maximization (Theorem 1 of Jerison and Jerison (1993)).
The next theorem provides a simple upper bound on the minimum number of observations
needed to form a strict revealed preference cycle.
Theorem 4. If for some K ≥ 3 the C1 demand function h has no K-cycles in some neighbor-
hood of (y∗, p∗), then for all vectors u and v in IRn, and every i, j = 1, . . . , n,
|uTAv| ≤ (1/2)[tan(pi/K)]|uT S¯u+ vT S¯v| and (8)
|Sij − Sji| ≤ 2[tan(pi/K)]|Sii|1/2|Sjj |1/2. (9)
Theorem 4 provides the desired bound since there must be a strict revealed preference cycle of
length K if K ≥ 3 is large enough to violate (8) or (9). The theorem shows how the minimum
number of observations required to form a revealed preference cycle is related to the sizes of
violations of Slutsky symmetry and negative semidefiniteness. With greater Slutsky asymmetry
in the plane spanned by u and v, the left side of (8) is larger, so the largest K satisfying
the inequality is smaller. Under the hypothesis, the demand function satisfies the weak weak
axiom and has a negative semidefinite Slutsky matrix. If we change S to make it “less negative
semidefinite” (i.e. if we add to it a symmetric matrix that is positive definite on the span of u
and v) then the term |uT S¯u+ vT S¯v| is reduced, and so is the largest K satisfying inequality (8).
If for a large K there are no strict revealed preference cycles of length K in the plane spanned by
u and v, then in that plane the antisymmetric part of the Slutsky matrix must be small relative
to the symmetric part. Similar reasoning applies to inequality (9).
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Remark 3. For the case of demands that are linear in income, Shafer (1977) showed that when
there are no K-cycles, with K ≥ 3,
|Sij − Sji| ≤ φ(K)|Sii − (hi)2|1/2|Sjj − (hj)2|1/2, (10)
where the Slutsky matrix and the demands hi and hj are evaluated at (y∗, p∗), and where
φ(K) ≡

2K1/2/(K − 2) for K even,
2K1/2[
(K − 2)2 − K
2 − 9
K2 − 1
]1/2 for K odd.
The inequality (9) in Theorem 4 applies to every C1 demand function. Furthermore, for
demands linear in income, (9) is strictly tighter than (10) unless one of the demands hi or hj is
0 (in which case, (9) and (10) are equivalent, both implying Sij = Sji).
If hi and hj are strictly positive at (y, p) then the bound (9) is tighter than (10) for two
reasons. First, Sii and Sjj are nonpositive since S is negative semidefinite, and therefore |Sii −
(hi)2| > |Sii| (and similarly with i replaced by j). The second reason is that 2 tan(pi/K) ≤ φ(K)
for K ≥ 3, and this inequality is strict for K > 4 (see Lemma 4, below). For large K, 2 tan(pi/K)
is approximately 2pi/K whereas φ(K) is approximately 2K−1/2. Table 1 contains some sample
values of the bounding functions 2 tan(pi/K) and φ(K).
Table 1. Comparison of 2 tan(pi/K) and φ(K).
K 2 tan(pi/K) φ(K)
3 3.464 3.464
4 2 2
5 1.453 1.549
6 1.155 1.225
9 .728 .865
50 .126 .295
100 .063 .204
1000 .0063 .0633
The proof of Theorem 4 shows that if the Slutsky matrix at (y∗, p∗) is sufficiently asymmetric
then every neighborhood of (y∗, p∗) contains a strict revealed preference cycle with price vectors
evenly spaced around a circle. It might be possible to improve on our bound by considering
cycles with other shapes.
One might also try to find a lower bound on the number of observations required to detect
inconsistency. The results in this section provide some relevant information. Suppose that there
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are no K-cycles in a neighborhood of (y∗, p∗). By Theorem 1 there is a neighborhood Q of the
origin such that IK(S(y, p), Q) = 0 for all (y, p) near (y∗, p∗). We conjecture that the converse is
false—that is, that requiring IK(S(y, p), Q) to be 0 on a neighborhood of (y∗, p∗) is not strong
enough to rule out K-cycles in a neighborhood of (y∗, p∗). Information about higher order
derivatives of the demand function might be needed to rule out cycles with few observations.
6. Conclusion
Smooth demand functions that are not generated by utility maximization have revealed
preference cycles. As one moves along these cycles, real income (defined with a chained Laspeyres
price index) grows at each step, yet prices and demands return to their starting values. The “real”
growth is illusory. The rate of real income growth along the worst cycle in a region is a variant of
Afriat’s cost-inefficiency, the most commonly used measure of demand inconsistency. Our main
theorem shows how this worst growth rate depends on the amount of price variation and on
behavioral inconsistency, measured by an index of violations of the Slutsky conditions. When
prices can vary between 1 − r and 1 + r the highest constant real income growth rate along a
cycle is approximately r2 times the Slutsky index.
Our results show how violations of the two Slutsky conditions combine in a single index to
produce given levels of revealed preference inconsistency. The connection with revealed preference
provides an economic interpretation for violations of the Slutsky conditions. The Slutsky index
itself is easy to compute and depends only on behavior, not on the environment. Our main
theorem also allows us to place a finite upper bound on the number of observations required to
detect revealed preference inconsistency. This solves a classic problem in demand theory.
The existence of cycles with continually increasing real income depends on the way in which
real income is defined. Our definition uses a chained Laspeyres price index. The consumption
base for the index is updated at each step along the cycle. The recent CPI Commission (Boskin,
et. al. (1998)) recommended such frequent updating of the consumption base, but they also
recommended replacing the Laspeyres index with a “superlative” price index (Diewert (1976)).
Using a superlative index seems to reduce the likelihood of real growth incoherence, but does
not rule it out altogether. We expect that the methods introduced above will also be useful for
studying cycles of real income growth defined with a superlative index.
We know of only two other papers that relate revealed preference cycles to the Slutsky
matrix. The first, Shafer (1977), is discussed in the introduction and in section 5, above. The
second, Jerison and Jerison (1993), provides a global upper bound on a variant of Afriat’s cost-
inefficiency when there are just two observations. With two observations, the only possible
revealed preference inconsistencies are violations of the weak weak axiom. The bound on these
inconsistencies depends on the price variation, the quadratic form of the Slutsky matrix and the
marginal propensity to consume.
Jerison and Jerison (1992, 1993) show how real income growth along smooth (Ville) cycles
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is related to the degree of Slutsky asymmetry and the amount of price variation. The 1992 paper
shows that when prices are confined to a ball of radius r, the instantaneous real growth rate
along the worst smooth cycle is approximately r times the norm of the antisymmetric part of the
Slutsky matrix. As the ball shrinks, the worst real growth rate shrinks in proportion to r instead
of the r2 found in the present paper. The reason for the difference is that the instantaneous
real growth rate is defined assuming that the velocity of price change is 1. For discrete cycles,
this is comparable to taking the real income growth from one observation to the next (as defined
above) and dividing it by the length of the vector of price changes. The resulting ratio is of order
r. Our 1993 paper derives a global upper bound on the instantaneous real income growth rate
along smooth cycles. The bound is determined by the amount of price variation, the Slutsky
asymmetry and the marginal propensity to consume. The problem with smooth cycles is that
they involve a continuum of data.
Jerison and Jerison (1996) provide a test for Slutsky symmetry using discrete cycles, but the
cycles are not necessarily revealed preference cycles. The test depends on an “antisymmetric”
income growth rate that is different from the growth rate used above. The antisymmetric growth
rate from observation k − 1 to observation k is defined to be the real income growth rate from
k − 1 to k (as in section 2, above) minus the real income growth rate in the opposite direction
(from k to k − 1). Subtracting the growth rate in the opposite direction removes the effect of
violations of the weak axiom. When the Slutsky matrix is symmetric, the antisymmetric growth
rate along the worst cycle in a ball of radius r is of order o(r2). Thus it shrinks faster than r2 as
r goes to zero.
The results in the present paper and in the previous literature leave many open problems.
Perhaps the most important is to develop reasonable inconsistency measures when demand is
stochastic. The results presented above provide some insight even in this case. They can be used
to characterize the inconsistency of a smooth mean demand function when a consumer’s demand
deviates stochastically from the mean. Of course it is still important to consider stochastic
demands explicitly.
The inconsistency measures in our analysis apply to demand functions that are known ex-
actly. However, in most applications, the demand functions are estimated. Statistical tests of
the Slutsky conditions in the empirical literature have the advantage that they take into ac-
count the imprecision of the demand estimation. But the statistical tests lack the economic
interpretation that our results provide for the Slutsky index. It would be desirable to find an
economically interpretable measure of Slutsky violations that allows for uncertainty about the
demand function.
Violations of the Slutsky conditions are the basis for tests of efficient consumption in the
collective demand model (Browning and Chiappori (1998)). In that model the aggregate demand
of a group of consumers can violate the Slutsky conditions because of the way group members
share their aggregate income. The connection between Slutsky violations and revealed prefer-
ence inconsistency in the present paper might provide additional insight into the structure of
the collective model. We expect that there are also connections between smooth integrability
conditions and discrete cycles in other economic contexts. For example, the path-dependence of
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consumer’s surplus (Chipman and Moore (1976)) can undoubtedly be linked to discrete cycles.
The results in the present paper are local. It would be worthwhile extending them to obtain
global bounds relating the Slutsky matrix to real growth rates along cycles in arbitrary regions
of income and price space. Our main theorem is a limit theorem. It makes a statement about an
infinite set of discrete cycles. In order to extend this to a statement about finite data we need a
global theorem.
To obtain a global extension of our main theorem it would be useful to have more specific
information about the shapes of worst revealed preference cycles. We conjecture that when the
price vectors are confined to a ball, the price vectors in the worst cycle lie in a three dimensional
space. Equation (4) suggests that this space is generated by the eigenvector corresponding to the
largest eigenvalue of the symmetric part of the Slutsky matrix and by the two vectors uk and vk
corresponding to the largest λk in the decomposition of the antisymmetric part of the Slutsky
matrix in equation (11), below. We conjecture that when the price vectors are confined to a box
the worst cycles also lie in low dimensional spaces, but this remains to be shown.
We derived an upper bound on the number of observations needed to detect revealed prefer-
ence inconsistency. A referee has asked whether a lower bound can be obtained from our results.
The problem is to find a condition on the Slutsky matrix that rules out cycles of length less than
K in some fixed region. We offered some ideas in section 5, above, but the problem remains
unsolved.
The choice of a measure of demand inconsistency must depend on what the measure is to
be used for. For smooth demand, the Slutsky index measures local behavioral inconsistency. It
is approximately equal to the cost-inefficiency adjusted for the variation in prices. For welfare
analysis it might be better to use the cost-inefficiency without the price adjustment. The cost-
inefficiency is a lower bound on the fraction of income that an inconsistent consumer appears to
be wasting. If there is very little price variation, the wastage can be small even if the Slutsky
index is large. Then the behavioral inconsistency is large, but it need not be costing the consumer
much.
On the other hand, for positive comparative static analysis, the question of interest might
be what size errors in demand elasticities are introduced if inconsistent behavior is modeled as
utility-maximizing, i.e., if one assumes that the Slutsky conditions are satisfied when in fact they
are not. In that case, the Slutsky index is likely to be useful. The Slutsky index might help
clarify the literature that claims that small deviations from optimization can have large effects
on resource allocation (e.g., Thaler (1992)). The “small” deviations in that literature refer to
welfare loss. We conjecture that in order for consumer deviations from optimization to have
large allocation effects the inconsistencies must be large according to the behavioral measure
introduced above.
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7. Proofs
Let (y∗, p∗) be fixed in IRn+1++ and let S, S¯ and A be respectively the Slutsky matrix of h
and its symmetric and antisymmetric parts evaluated at (y∗, p∗), as defined in (1) in Section 2.
Let h, hy and hp denote respectively the function h and its derivatives with respect to y and p,
evaluated at (y∗, p∗). Let δkl be the Kronecker delta, equal to 1 if k = l and equal to 0 otherwise.
Lemma 1. A =
m∑
k=1
λk(ukvTk − vkuTk ) (11)
for scalars λk > 0 and real vectors uk, vk, satisfying uk · ul = δkl = vk · vl and uk · vl = 0 for
k, l = 1, . . . ,m.
Proof. Since A is skew–symmetric, iA is Hermitian and has m positive eigenvalues λk > 0 and
m negative eigenvalues −λk corresponding to the eigenvectors uk− ivk and uk+ ivk respectively,
where uk and vk are real vectors. The remaining eigenvalues of iA are zero. Thus A(uk + ivk) =
iλk(uk + ivk) and A(uk − ivk) = −iλk(uk − ivk). This implies Auk = −λkvk and Avk = λkuk,
and Aw = 0 for w orthogonal to all uk and vk vectors. Let 〈·, ·〉 be the standard (Hermitian)
inner product. The eigenvectors of iA can be chosen so that
〈uk + ivk, ul + ivl〉 = uk · ul + vk · vl + i(vk · ul − uk · vl)
= 2δkl (12)
where δkl is the Kronecker delta. Also for all k and l,
0 = 〈uk + ivk, ul − ivl〉 = uk · ul − vk · vl + i(uk · vl + vk · ul). (13)
By (13), uk · ul = vk · vl and by (12) uk · ul = −vk · vl for k 6= l. So for k 6= l, uk · ul = vk · vl = 0.
Also by (13), uk · vl = −vk · ul, and by (12), uk · vl = vk · ul, so uk · vl = 0 for all k, l. Finally
uk ·uk+ vk · vk = 2 ·uk ·uk = 2, so uk and vk are unit vectors. Letting uj+m ≡ vj for 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
there are vectors uj for j > m such that the set of uj , j = 1, . . . , n forms an orthonormal basis
for IRn. Then Auj =
m∑
k=1
λk(ukvTk − vkuTk )uj for j = 1, . . . , n, which completes the proof.
Lemma 2. Given scalars xj , j = 1, . . . ,m, if |∑mj=1 xj | ≤ 1 and |xj | ≤ 1 for all j and if
0 < ρ < 1/2, then
(1 + ρx1)(1 + ρx2) · · · (1 + ρxm) ≥ e−ρ−ρ2m.
Proof. Define Mk ≡ ∑mj=1 xkj for each integer k ≥ 1. Under the hypotheses of the lemma,
|M1| ≤ 1 and |Mk| ≤ m for each k. Also ∑∞k=2 ρk = ρ2/(1 − ρ), and therefore ∑∞k=2 ρk/k ≤
ρ2/[2(1 − ρ)] ≤ ρ2 since ρ < 1/2. Using the Taylor series ln(1 + a) = ∑∞k=1(−1)k+1k−1ak, we
have
m∑
j=1
ln(1 + ρxj) =
∞∑
k=1
(−1)k+1k−1ρkMk
≥ ρM1 −
∞∑
k=2
k−1ρkm ≥ −ρ− ρ2m
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Proof of Theorem 1. In this proof, we let h, hy and hp denote the function h and its matrices
of partial derivatives, all evaluated at (y∗, p∗). Define R∗(z, q) ≡ h(y∗+z, p∗+q)−h−zhy−hpq.
Consider an arbitrary K-cycle {(y∗ + rzk, p∗ + rqk)}Kk=0 with each zk in IR and qk in IRn. We
will compute the real growth rate of this cycle using the following notation.
Define Λ ≡∑k λkukvTk , using the notation in (11). Let qˆ be the cycle {qk}Kk=0. Define
Γ(qˆ) ≡ (1/K)
K∑
k=1
[(1/2)(qk − qk−1)T S¯(qk − qk−1) + qTk−1Aqk]. (14)
Let 0 ≡ 0, and define k recursively by
k ≡ k−1 + (1/2)(qk − qk−1)TS(qk − qk−1) + qTk−1Aqk + qTk Λqk − qk−1Λqk−1 − Γ(qˆ)
for k = 1, . . . ,K. Summing (k − k−1) over k = 1, . . . ,K yields
K =
∑
(k − k−1) =
∑
[(1/2)(qk − qk−1)TS(qk − qk−1) + qTk−1Aqk − Γ({qk}k)] = 0 = 0.
Thus the sequence {k}Kk=0 is a cycle.
The income level at observation k in the cycle is y∗ + rzk. It will be convenient to write zk
in the following form:
zk = hT qk + (1/2)rqTk Sqk + rq
T
k Λqk − rk + δk (15)
for k = 0, 1, . . . ,K. (Use (15) to define δk.) The sequence {δk} is a K-cycle since {zk}Kk=0,
{k}Kk=0 and qˆ are K-cycles.
We next find an expression for the growth rate of the cycle {(y∗ + rzk, p∗ + rqk)}Kk=0. For
a fixed integer m ∈ [1,K], let p ≡ rqm and q ≡ rqm−1. Then the real income growth from
observation m− 1 to observation m is
rzm − rzm−1 − (p− q)[h+ rzm−1hy + hpq +R∗(rzm−1, q)]
= (p− q)Th+ (1/2)pTSp− (1/2)qTSq + pTΛp− qTΛq + r2m−1 − r2m + rδm − rδm−1
− (p− q)Th− (p− q)ThyhT q − rδm−1(p− q)Thy − (p− q)Thpq + o(r2)
= (1/2)pTSp− (1/2)qTSq − (p− q)TSq + pTΛp− qTΛq
+ r2m−1 − r2m + rδm − rδm−1 − rδm−1(p− q)Thy + o(r2)
= (1/2)(p− q)TS(p− q) + qTAp+ pTΛp− qTΛq
+ r2m−1 − r2m + rδm − rδm−1 − rδm−1(p− q)Thy + o(r2)
= r2Γ(qˆ) + rδm − rδm−1 − rδm−1(p− q)Thy + o(r2). (16)
Now suppose that δk = 0 for k = 0, 1, . . . ,K. In that case, by (16) the cycle {(y∗+ rzk, p∗+
rqk)}Kk=0 has minimum real income growth rate r2Γ(qˆ) + o(r2), so limr→0 r−2G({(y∗ + rzk, p∗ +
20
rqk)}Kk=0) = Γ(q˜) = IK(S, qˆ). For this choice of zk we have |zk| ≤ γ when r is sufficiently small.
Therefore
lim inf
r→0
r−2 sup{G({(y∗ + rz′k, p∗ + rqk)}Kk=0) : |z′k| ≤ γ, ∀k} ≥ I(S, qˆ).
The right side of this inequality attains a maximum with respect to qˆ in CK(Q) since Q is
compact and Γ is continuous. Therefore we can take the supremum of both sides with respect to
qˆ ∈ CK(Q) and obtain lim infr→0 r−2GK((y∗, p∗) + rN) ≥ IK(S,Q).
Given any α > 0 there exists K such that IK(S,Q) > I(S,Q)− (α/2). The argument in the
previous paragraph shows that for sufficiently small r > 0 there is a cycle cˆ(r) ≡ {(y∗+ rzk, p∗+
rqk)}Kk=0 in C((y∗, p∗) + rN) with r−2G(cˆ(r)) > IK(S,Q) − (α/2) > I(S,Q) − α. This shows
that lim infr→0 r−2G((y∗, p∗) + rN) ≥ I(S,Q).
In order to complete the proof, we will show that lim supr→0 r−2G((y∗, p∗)+rN) ≤ I(S,Q).
A special case of the same proof shows that this last inequality holds when the subscript K is
added to G and I. Another special case shows that
lim sup
r→0
r−2 sup{G({(y∗ + rz′k, p∗ + rqk)}Kk=0) : |z′k| ≤ γ, ∀k} ≤ I(S, qˆ),
which, combined with the argument above, implies (5).
To prove lim supr→0 r−2G((y∗, p∗) + rN) ≤ I(S,Q) we suppose instead that this inequality
is false. Then there exists a scalar α > 0 and a sequence {ri}∞i=1 converging to zero, and, for
each i, a K(i)-cycle {(y∗ + rizk(i), p∗ + riqk(i))}K(i)k=0 in CK(i)((y∗, p∗) + riN) that has minimum
real income growth rate greater than r2i (I(S,Q) + α). In the derivation above, replace r by ri
and zk, qk and K by zk(i), qk(i) and K(i). Then (15) determines δk(i) for k = 0, 1, . . . ,K(i);
and {δk(i)}k is a K(i)-cycle for each i. Since each qk(i) is in Q, there is a fixed compact set
that contains every k(i). Since each zk(i) is in [−γ, γ], equation (15) implies that |δk(i)| < 2γ,
∀k ≤ K(i) for sufficiently large i. By (16), for each i,
min
m
{Γ({qk(i)}k) + (1/ri)(δm(i)− δm−1(i))− δm−1(i)(qm(i)− qm−1(i))Thy + r−2i o(r2i )}
≥ I(S,Q) + α ≥ Γ({qk(i)}k) + α.
Therefore there is some ν > 0 satisfying
(1/ri)(δm(i)− δm−1(i))− δm−1(i)(qm(i)− qm−1(i))Thy ≥ ν
for sufficiently large i and for all m = 1, . . . ,K(i). Let β be larger than γ and larger than
sup{qhy : q ∈ Q}. Define
xm(i) ≡ (2β)−1(qm(i)− qm−1(i))Thy,
and define ρi ≡ 2βri. Then for sufficiently large i and for all m = 1, . . . ,K(i), we have ρi < 1/2
and
δm(i)− δm−1(i)− ρiδm−1(i)xm(i) ≥ riν.
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In what follows, we restrict attention to i large enough so that these inequalities hold. Since
|qk(i)hy| < β, we have |∑bm=a xm(i)| ≤ 1 for each a and b with 1 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ K(i). Also, since
{qk(i)}K(i)k=0 is a cycle,
∑K(i)
m=1 xm(i) = 0. Therefore, omitting i as an argument of the functions
K, δm and xm,
δK ≥ riν + δK−1(1 + ρixK)
≥ riν + (1 + ρixK)riν + δK−2(1 + ρixK)(1 + ρixK−1)
≥ riν[1 + (1 + ρixK) + (1 + ρixK)(1 + ρixK−1)+
. . .+ (1 + ρixK)(1 + ρixK−1) · · · (1 + ρix2)]
+ δ0(1 + ρixK)(1 + ρixK−1) · · · (1 + ρix1).
Since δK(i) = δ0(i), we have (again omitting i as an argument of the functions K and xm for
each m)
δ0(i)[1− (1 + ρixK)(1 + ρixK−1) · · · (1 + ρix1)]
≥ riν[1 + (1 + ρixK) + (1 + ρixK)(1 + ρixK−1)+
. . .+ (1 + ρixK)(1 + ρixK−1) · · · (1 + ρix2)]. (17)
Note that (1 + ρixK)(1 + ρixK−1) · · · (1 + ρix1) ≤ 1 since ∑K(i)k=1 xk(i) = 0. Since the right-
hand side of (17) is strictly positive, it follows that δ0(i) > 0. Since 2β > δ0(i), Lemma 2 implies
that the left-hand side of (17) is less than 2β(1 − e−K(i)ρ2i ). Next, consider the right-hand side
of (17). Since |∑K(i)k=1 xk| ≤ 1, Lemma 2 implies that
1 + (1 + ρixK) + (1 + ρixK)(1 + ρixK−1) + . . .+ (1 + ρixK)(1 + ρixK−1) · · · (1 + ρix2)
≥
K−1∑
m=0
exp(−ρi −mρ2i ) = e−ρi(1− eK(i)ρ2i )/(1− e−ρ2i ).
It follows that
2β(1− e−K(i)ρ2i ) ≥ νρi(2β)−1e−ρi(1− eK(i)ρ2i )/(1− e−ρ2i )
for sufficiently large i. But this last inequality is violated for sufficiently large i since ρe−ρ/(1−
e−ρ2) approaches infinity as ρ goes to zero. This contradiction implies that the hypothesis
lim sup
r→0
r−2G((y∗, p∗) + rN) > I(S,Q)
is false. Therefore
lim
r→0 r
−2G((y∗, p∗) + rN) = I(S,Q).
The same argument, with K(i) taken to be fixed, proves that limr→0 r−2GK((y∗, p∗) + rN) =
IK(S,Q) for each K. Equation (5) follows from the same proof, letting qk(i) and K(i) be qk and
K in the hypothesis of the theorem for every i.
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Lemma 3. Let K be an integer greater than 2 and let θ ≡ 2pi/K. Then
1
K
K∑
k=1
cos kθ[cos kθ − cos((k − 1)θ)] = 1
K
K∑
k=1
sin kθ[sin kθ − sin((k − 1)θ)] (18)
= (1− cos θ)/2, and (19)
K∑
k=1
[sin kθ cos((k − 1)θ) + cos kθ sin((k − 1)θ)] =
K∑
k=1
sin((2k − 1)θ) = 0. (20)
Proof. For any τ ,
K∑
k=1
e(2k+τ)iθ = eτiθe2iθ
e2iθK − 1
e2iθ − 1 = 0.
The real and imaginary parts of this geometric sum are respectively
K∑
k=1
cos[(2k + τ)θ] = 0 (21)
and
K∑
k=1
sin[(2k + τ)θ] = 0. (22)
To prove (18), we use angle addition identities and note that the lefthand side of (18) minus the
righthand side is
(1/K)
K∑
k=1
{cos2 kθ − sin2 kθ + sin kθ sin[(k − 1)θ]− cos kθ cos[(k − 1)θ]}
= (1/K)
K∑
k=1
cos 2kθ − (1/K)
K∑
k=1
cos[(2k − 1)θ] = 0,
where the last equation follows from (21). To prove (19), use equation (18) and note that the
sum of the left and righthand sides of (18) is
(1/K)
K∑
k=1
{cos2 kθ + sin2 kθ − [cos kθ cos((k − 1)θ) + sin kθ sin((k − 1)θ)]}
= 1− cos θ.
Equation (20) follows from an angle addition identity and (22).
Proof of Theorem 3. The right side of (4) is
Γ ≡ 1
K
K∑
k=1
[(1/2)(qk − qk−1)TS(qk − qk−1) + qTk−1Aqk]
=
1
K
K∑
k=1
[qTk Sqk + q
T
k−1(A− S¯)qk].
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Let θ ≡ 2pi/K. Under the hypothesis of the theorem, qk = (cos kθ)u + (sin kθ)v. Using these
identities, Lemma 3 and the fact that xTAx = 0 for every n-vector x, we obtain
Γ =
1
K
K∑
k=1
{(cos2 kθ)uT S¯u+ (sin2 kθ)vT S¯v + (sin 2kθ)uT S¯v
− [cos kθ cos(k − 1)θ]uT S¯u− [sin kθ sin(k − 1)θ]vT S¯v
+ [sin kθ cos(k − 1)θ]uT (A− S¯)v + [cos kθ sin(k − 1)θ]vT (A− S¯)u}
=
1
K
K∑
k=1
{(cos kθ)[cos kθ − cos(k − 1)θ]uTSu+ (sin kθ)[sin kθ − sin(k − 1)θ]vTSv
− [sin kθ cos(k − 1)θ + cos kθ sin(k − 1)θ]uT S¯v
+ [sin kθ cos(k − 1)θ − cos kθ sin(k − 1)θ]uTAv}
= (1/2)(1− cos θ)(uTSu+ vTSv) + (sin θ)uTAv,
which proves (7).
Proof of Remark 2. I(S,Q) is nonnegative since it is at least as great as I(S, ·) evaluated at
a cycle with qk = qk−1 for all k. If S is symmetric and negative semidefinite, then A = 0 and the
right side of (4) is nonpositive, so I(S,Q) = 0. Suppose now that Q is a compact neighborhood
of the origin. If S is not negative semidefinite, then there is some q ∈ Q such that qTSq > 0,
and I(S,Q) ≥ I(S, {0, q, 0}) = qTSq > 0. If S is asymmetric, then by Theorem 3 in section 5,
below, there is a cycle q in Q such that 0 < I(S, q) ≤ I(S,Q).
Suppose that D ≡ Sˆ − S is symmetric and positive semidefinite. Let {qk} be the cycle that
maximizes (3) over cycles in Q and let sk ≡ qk−qk−1. By (4), I(S+D, {qk}) ≥ I(S, {qk}). If this
holds with equality, then
∑K
k=1 s
T
kDsk = 0 and s
T
kDsk = 0 for all k. The budget identity implies
SˆT p∗ = ST p∗ = 0, hence Dp∗ = 0. Suppose that D has rank n − 1. Then each sk is collinear
with p∗, and there exist scalars γk such that qk = q0 + γkp∗ for each k. Since γK = γ0 = 0
and
∑K
k=1 γk =
∑K
k=1 γk−1, we have IK(S,Q) = I(S, {qk}) = (1/K)
∑K
k=1(q0 + γkp
∗)TS(γk −
γk−1)p∗ = 0. This proves that if IK(S,Q) > 0 then IK(Sˆ, Q) ≥ I(Sˆ, {qk}) > I(S, {qk}).
IK(S + tA,Q) is nondecreasing in t ≥ 0 because whenever a cycle {qk} maximizes the right
side of (4), the term
∑K
k=1 q
T
k−1Aqk is nonnegative. Otherwise, one obtains a larger value for
(4) by following the cycle in the opposite direction, using the cycle {q′k} with q′k = qK−k. By
the envelope theorem, the derivative of IK(S + tA,Q) with respect to t evaluated at t = 0 is∑K
k=1 q
T
k−1Aqk, which is 0 only if IK(S,Q) = IK(S¯, Q).
Given Q, a compact neighborhood of the origin, I(S, q) is linear in S for each cycle q in
Q. Therefore I(S,Q) is linear in S and satisfies the triangle inequality I(S,Q) + I(Sˆ, Q) ≥
I(S + Sˆ, Q). I(S,Q) is zero only if S satisfies the Slutsky conditions, so if I(A,Q) = 0 then
A = 0. This shows that I(·, Q) is a norm on the space of skew-symmetric matrices.
Proof of Theorem 4. Suppose that h has no K-cycles for some K ≥ 3. Then h satisfies
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the weak weak axiom of revealed preference and has a negative semidefinite Slutsky matrix S at
(y, p). By Theorem 3, the right side of (7) is nonpositive. Since −uT S¯u−vT S¯v = |uT S¯u+vT S¯v|,
uTAv ≤ 1− cos(2pi/K)
2 sin(2pi/K)
|uT S¯u+ vT S¯v|.
This implies (8) since the double angle formulas cos 2α = cos2 α−sin2 α and sin 2α = 2 sinα cosα
imply [1− cos(2pi/K)]/ sin(2pi/K) = tan(pi/K).
To prove (9), let ei be the unit vector with ith component equal to 1. Substituting u =√
Sjj ei and v =
√
Sii ej into (8) yields
(1/2)
√
SiiSjj(Sij − Sji) ≤ (1/2)[tan(pi/K)]|2SiiSjj |, hence
Sij − Sji ≤ 2[tan(pi/K)]|Sii|1/2|Sjj |1/2.
The same steps with the definitions of u and v interchanged show that (9) holds.
Lemma 4. tan
pi
K
<
√
K
K − 2 for K > 4.
Proof. Let x = 1/K. We want to show that tan pix <
x−1/2
(1/x)− 2 =
x1/2
1− 2x for x ∈ (0, 1/4).
This is equivalent to showing that
F (x) ≡ x
1/2
1− 2x ·
cos pix
sin pix
> 1 on (0, 1/4).
Note that F > 0 on (0, 1/4) and that F (1/4) = 1. Define G(x) ≡ ln F (x) on (0, 1/4]. Then
G(1/4) = 0. We will show that G′(x) < 0 and hence G(x) > 0 and F (x) > 1 for x ∈ (0, 1/4).
Since
G′(x) = 1
2x
+
2
1− 2x −
pi sin pix
cos pix
− pi cos pix
sin pix
=
1− 2x+ 4x
2x(1− 2x) −
2pi
2(sin pix)(cos pix)
=
1− 2x
2x(1− 2x) −
2x
sin 2pix
,
we have G′ < 0 on (0, 1/4) if and only if sin 2pix < 4pix(1− 2x)
1 + 2x
for all x ∈ (0, 1/4).
Note that 8x(1− 2x) < 4pix(1− 2x)
1 + 2x
for x ∈ (0, 1/4) since 8x(1+ 2x) < 4pix is equivalent to
2 + 4x < pi, which holds for x < 1/4. Therefore to prove that G′ < 0 on (0, 1/4), it is sufficient
to show that sin 2pix ≤ 8x(1 − 2x) for all x ∈ (0, 1/4). Define f(x) ≡ 8x(1 − 2x) − sin 2pix.
We will show that f is nonnegative on [0, 1/4]. Note first that f(0) = f(1/4) = 0. Since
f ′(x) = 8(1− 2x)− 16x− 2pi cos 2pix, we have f ′(0) = 8− 2pi > 0 and f ′(1/4) = 0. In addition,
f ′′(x) = −32 + 4pi2 sin 2pix is strictly increasing on [0, 1/4] with f ′′(0) < 0 < f ′′(1/4). Finally,
f ′(1/8) = 4 − pi√2 < 0 and f ′′(1/8) = −32 + 2pi2√2 < 0. This shows that f ′ is negative at
1/8 and first decreases, then increases on the interval [1/8, 1/4], and equals 0 at 1/4. Therefore
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f ′ < 0 on [1/8, 1/4). Since f(1/4) = 0, we have f > 0 on [1/8, 1/4). Since f ′′(1/8) < 0 and f ′′ is
increasing on (0, 1/8), f is concave on (0, 1/8), with f(0) = 0. This shows that f > 0 on (0, 1/8),
and f is nonnegative on [0, 1/4].
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